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I Introduction
In this paper, I shall present and clarify the peculiar and non-standard1 character
of Meister Eckhart’s natural theology.
While in more prominent scholastic conceptions, natural theology tends to be
understood as an internal branch or articulation of general metaphysics (ontol-
ogy), in Meister Eckhart’s philosophical perspective these two disciplines form a
unity.
The peculiarity of this approach has a major consequence especially with
regard to the question of God’s existence. This is, namely, regarded not as the
result of an inference but asmetaphysical self-evidence.
To better elucidate the distinctiveness of the Eckhartian position, I will divide
my paper into two major parts. In the first part, I will supply a general presenta-
tion of the standard version of natural theology, of its relation to general meta-
physics and of some problems that it generates. In order to represent these issues
more effectively, I will connect them with the scholastic debate concerning the
“subject of metaphysics”.
The second part will be divided in two sections: in the first one I will provide
a general exposition of the non-standard conception of natural theology. In the
second, I will demonstrate that this position is at the center of Eckhart’s metaphy-
sical thought. This last point will be proven by an analysis of some ideas of
Eckhart’s major and unfinished Tripartite Work (Opus tripartitum).
II Standard natural theology
II.1 Some preliminary notes
When we talk about “natural theology”, we usually refer to a philosophical disci-
pline that aims, first, at proving the existence of God; and second, at explainingHis
attributes.
Concerning the first point, there are traditionally two possible approaches.
The first one might be called a “bottom-up” approach (quia), since it starts with a
consideration of “worldly features” and moves from there to the existence of God.
The second one might be called, on the contrary, a “top-down” approach (propter
1 The term “non-standard” does not mean of course that this position is unique, but it refers to
the fact that it is not as prominent as those developed, for example, by other scholastics such as
Aquinas and Scotus.
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quid), since it starts with a consideration of God’s essence and moves from there
to His existence.
The first approach can be illustrated through a broadly Thomistic example
(the so called first way)2:
1) It is a fact that there are things which are in motion.
2) Now, whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.
3) Hence, if a mover is itself in motion, it must be put in motion by another
mover.
4) Now, it is not possible for this series of moved movers to be infinite.
5) Therefore, there must be a first unmoved mover and this everyone under-
stands to be God.
This proof starts with a consideration of motion and it may be regarded, from an
Aristotelian point of view, as a so called physical proof, but it has at its core (at
least according to some Thomistic interpretations) a more fundamental metaphy-
sical character.
First of all, “motion” does not mean here simply local movement. It may refer
also to different kinds of change and variations, such as the heating of water or
the ripening of an apple. At the heart of this idea lies the concept of motion as
“actualization”, or as a transition from potency to actuality. As a result: the idea
that everything in motion requires something that moves it, is based on the fact
that potency cannot rise itself to actuality and needs therefore something already
in act.
Now, the metaphysical character of this proof emerges if we consider being
itself as actuality. The coming into existence (i.e. the substantial change) or the
acquiring of a new property (i.e. accidental change) are thus to be regarded as
forms of actualization3.
The general idea is therefore the following: the different forms of actualiza-
tion could not happen if there were not, at the bottom, a difference between what
something is (essence) and the fact that it is (act of being). For example, human
beings can come into being and cease to be, or acquire a new way of being (for
2 St. Thomas AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, I q. 2 a.3. For an interesting and insightful analysis
of the Thomistic five ways see Edward FESER, Aquinas (London: Oneworld Publications, 2009),
62–130.
3 St. Thomas AQUINAS, SummaTheologica, I q.4 a.1 ad. 3 “ipsum esse est perfectissimumomnium,
comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus [...] unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam
ipsarum formarum.” This thesis is also quite important for the Eckhartian conception, see Meister
ECKHART, Die lateinischen Werke (=LW), Josef Koch a. o. (ed.), (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1936 f.)
LW I, 153, 8–9.
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example the ability to speak French), because existence and the ability to speak
French are not necessarily connected with the essence of humanity. But this also
means that these actualizations, based on the separation between essence and
the act of being, require a “pure actualizer” in which these two principles are
identical.
If we now come back to the argument for God’s existence, we can reformulate
it in the following terms:
1) The separation of existence and essence presupposes the identity of existence
and essence.
2) Now, there are things in which existence and essence are different.
3) Therefore there is the identity of existence and essence.
So far we discussed a bottom-up-approach to God according to a broadly Thomis-
tic view. There is, as I mentioned before, another possible way, which we might
define as broadly Anselmian and starts from a sort of quasi definition of the
essence of God and infers from that His existence. So we could say, for example,
that:
1) God is the greatest conceivable thing.
2) Now, it is greater to exist than not to exist.
3) Therefore, God exists (otherwise we should assume that there is something
greater than the greatest conceivable thing).
4) Besides, the greatest conceivable thing exists necessarily because to have
only a factual existence is less great than to have a necessary one4.
In this case we have, as I also mentioned before, a top-down-movement, in the
sense that the starting point is not the consideration of worldly features but a pure
reflection on God’s essence.
In spite of the fundamental differences existing between these two ap-
proaches, there is an important common point. In both cases we come to conceive
of God as identity between essence and existence. This conception of God is, in
other words, the result of an inference. That means that, at least preliminarily, both
the idea of God and of existence can be considered as something separable.
In the case of the ontological argument, we begin for example with a quasi-
definition of God. Now, if this definition has to work as a starting point for an
argument proving God’s necessary existence, it has, again preliminarily, to leave
4 St. ANSELM, Proslogion, chapter 2 and 3. For a presentation of the ontological argument, see, for
example, Brian DAVIES, “Anselm and the ontological argument”, in Brian Davies and Brian
Leftow, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
157–178.
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open the possibility that God does not exist and thus it has to concede an initial
form of separability of His essence and existence.
In the broadly Thomistic a posteriori argument, not only do we presuppose
the preliminary separability of God’s essence and existence, but we also initially
grasp existence in finite and contingent things, and we move from there to the
inseparability in God.
This feature, common to the two approaches, has a fundamental conse-
quence: the preliminary separability presupposed by the inferential nature of
natural theology implies a form of existence of something which is not divine
(since the separability of essence and existence is the main character of the
non-divine being). But this means also that the identity-thesis (of existence and
essence) is something referring to a portion of reality only (namely to God, and
His existence).
Put in another way: from the inferential nature of natural theology it is
possible to derive the thesis that the proper domain of this discipline (divine
being) is internal to being in general, which contains divine and non-divine being.
The inferential nature of natural theology is therefore related to its being part of a
more general ontology. In a word: inferential natural theology is (at least par-
tially) specialmetaphysics.5
II.2 Standard natural theology and the subject of metaphysics
This relationship between the inferential nature of natural theology and its local
dimension should be considered now in a more precise historical way. In order to
achieve this, I will concentrate on the question of the so called “subject of
metaphysics”. This theme, being also a central topic of scholastic metaphysical
debate, will enable us to reframe our discussion in a more specific medieval way
and prepare us to approach Meister Eckhart’s text.
5 It is interesting to notice that natural theology seems to have a local dimension even if we
consider the preliminary separation of essence and existence as a pure “distinctio rationis sine
fundamento in re”. Even in this case it seems that the rational/mental being presupposed by the
inference, points to the existence of something non-divine existing beside the divine being. Divine
being appears therefore, once again, to be something internal to being as such.
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II.2.1 The Avicennian approach
In the context of scholastic philosophy and theology, the term “subject” is often
used in a quasi-technical manner and it refers to the common notion circumscrib-
ing and unifying what a particular science describes and analyzes. So we might
say, for example, that the soul constitutes the subject of psychology.
What is now the subject of metaphysics? The founder of this discipline,
Aristotle, defines first philosophy (metaphysics) in different ways, but two as-
pects are especially central in this context: the idea of first philosophy as uni-
versal science of being (book IV) on the one hand, and the idea of first philosophy
as science of the first causes and of the “most dignified” kind of being (book VI)
on the other.
Now, these two approaches regarding the subject of this science raise a
fundamental problem because the first universalistic conception seems to contra-
dict the second paradigmatic and local one.6 What was the answer given to this
problem by medieval philosophers? Aristotle came to the medieval West not in
his pure form, but specifically through the mediation of Arabic and Persian
Philosophers, most notably, Avicenna. He argues that God cannot be regarded as
the subject of metaphysics, because He is for this discipline an object of research
and demonstration, and these features are incompatible with the idea of a subject
as such. In other words: the subject of a science is something presupposed by
that particular science and must be accepted by it as a given.7 The subject of
metaphysics is therefore, according to Avicenna (and this became also the promi-
nent scholastic point of view), not God, but being as such. This means that this
discipline is first of all to be considered as a universal science studying and
analyzing the most general features of reality (ontology).
What is in this context the role of the theological moment of metaphysics?
According to Avicenna, divine being is not to be considered as something ground-
ing being in general, since being, absolutely considered, does not have a principle
(ens in se absolute non habet principium)8. The theological principle has to be
regarded as something internal to the ontological frame.
6 The classical study on the “subject of metaphysics” in the philosophy of the 13th and 14th centu-
ries is the one written by Albert Zimmermann. See Albert ZIMMERMANN,Ontologie oder Metaphysik?
Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, (Leuven: Peeters
Publishers, 1998).
7 So we might say that, if the soul is the subject of psychology, this discipline has to accept the
soul as a given domain to which its explanatory power is bounded.
8 AVICENNA LATINUS, Liber de Philosophia prima sive scientia divina, I, c. 1 (ed. Van Riet), 14.
“Deinde principium non est principium omnium entium. Si enim omnium entium esset princi-
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We see therefore that the Avicennian approach contains both elements char-
acterizing the standard form of natural Theology: inference and local dimension.9
There are some problems, however, connected with this approach and these
are, at least from a medieval point of view, at the same time exegetical and
theoretical.10 They are exegetical because they exclude the Aristotelian idea that
metaphysics studies the first causes and the principle of being as being, and that
the subject of metaphysics is God.11 There are also theoretical problems, because,
if we accept this Avicennian line of thought, we have to consider being qua being
as a sort of objective area of research for metaphysics and we have to regard
metaphysics itself as a sort of super-science which differs only in quantity (in
extension) from other sciences. Now, the problem with this conception is that
being seems to remain (at least partially) a sort of super-genus and this seems to
contradict its transgeneric (transcendental)12 character.
Besides, since this position regards being as being as the subject of metaphy-
sics itself, and since the subject of a science cannot be the object of demonstra-
tion, metaphysics has to consider being as being as a sort of brute fact. The
foundational power of the first cause (of God) must therefore be limited. It is a
portion of reality grounding another portion of reality. But this position generates
again a fundamental problem because God and creatures, being part of the same
pium, tunc esset principium sui ipsius, ens autem in se absolute non habet principium; sed autem
principium unumquodque esse quod scitur. Principium igitur est principium aliquibus entibus.
Quapropter haec scientia non erit inquirens principia entis absolute, sed principia alicuius
entium, sicut principia ceterarum scientiarumparticularium.”
9 It is in this sense interesting to notice that it has been suggested, not only that Avicenna is the
father of the metaphysical argument for the existence of God a posteriori, but that he is also the
founder of the ontological argument. See for example Parviz MOREWEDGE, “Ibn Sina Avicenna and
Malcolm and the ontological argument”, TheMonist 54 (1970), 234–249.
10 For the development of this theme I rely particularly on Stephen D. DUMONT, “Scotus’s
Doctrine of Univocity and the Medieval Tradition of Metaphysics”, in: Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas
Speer, ed.Was ist Philosophie imMittelalter? (Berlin/New York:Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 193–212.
11 ARISTOTELES, Met. E l. This approachwas famously defended by Averroes.
12 “A transcendental notion is one which is above every genus, common to all things and thus
not restricted to any category or individual. Being is a transcendental insofar as everything real,
whether a substance, an accident, or whatever, is a being of some sort or other.” Edward FESER,
Scholastic Metaphysics. A contemporary introduction (Heusenstamm: Editiones scholasticae 2014),
139. For an extensive presentation of the “transcendental thought” in medieval Philosophy, see
Jan A. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012).
Wouter GORIS, Jan A. AERTSEN, “Medieval Theories of Transcendentals”, The Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2013/entries/transcendentals-medieval/>.
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subject, cannot be considered as completely different und this leads, on the side
of God, to a loss of transcendence and absoluteness.
II.2.2 Aquinas’ solution
To avoid this problem, a tendency developed amongst some scholastics to attenu-
ate the role of the subject of metaphysics. This aspect appears for example in
Saint Thomas Aquinas’ position.
Aquinas starts his exposition of the Aristotelian metaphysics recalling three
main definitions given by Aristotle: metaphysics as science of the first causes,
as science of being as being and as science of the separated substances (God
and angels). In his introduction, he identifies the most general causes with God
(and also the other separated substances) on the one hand and on the other (in
agreement with Avicenna) the subject of metaphysics with being as being.
Now, and this is the main point of Aquinas, we should consider the theologi-
cal aspect not as something subordinate or internal to the ontological frame, but
we should regard it as a sort of secondmoment of the samemetaphysical dynamic,
since
it pertains to one and the same science to consider both the proper causes of some genus
and the genus itself; for example, the philosophy of nature considers the principles of a
natural body. Therefore, it must be the office of one and the same science to consider the
separate substances and being in general (ens commune), which is the genus of which the
aforementioned substances are the common and universal causes.13
There is, however, a difference concerning the way through which we discover
the starting (ens commune) and the end point (Deus) of metaphysics.
According to Aquinas
that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces
all its concepts, is being. Consequently, all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by
additions to being. But nothing can be added to being as though it were something not
included in being – in the way that a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a
subject – for every reality is essentially a being.14
13 St. Thomas AQUINAS, Sententia super Metaphysicam, trans. John P. Rowan (Notre Dame, Ind.:
DumbOx Books, 2001), Prologue.
14 St. Thomas AQUINAS, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, James V.
McGlynn, and RobertW. Schmidt (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), I.1, 5. This is also the development
of an Avicennian idea. See AVICENNA LATINUS, Liber de philosophia prima, I, c. 5.
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In this passage being emerges as the result of a so called “resolution”. A resolu-
tion is a process through which we make explicit what our epistemic access to
reality presupposes. That means: we have a cognitive access to reality, which we
articulate in different sciences, because we have known being all along. Now, the
kind of being that we reach through this resolution is on the one hand something
running through all categories, and thus something transcendental (transgene-
ric), on the other hand it still has a genus-character, because it is to be conceived
as the most general predicate. In another work, Aquinas describes this character-
istic by calling the commonness of this being “commonness by predication”15. In
short, the sort of being resulting from this resolution is the same super-genus
(common being/esse commune) that constitutes the subject of metaphysics.16
Now, Aquinas emphasizes that the result of this resolution consists in the
expression of something self-evident, of something which is first for us (knower).
God (the result of the second moment of Metaphysics) is, on the other hand,
“common by causality” and that means that He is the first ontologically, but He is
the last epistemologically. In other words, while common being is a sort of self-
evidence, which we express through the resolution, divine being is the result of a
metaphysical inference.
Aquinas’ point might therefore be reframed in the following way: on the one
hand he connects the subject of metaphysics (common being/ens commune) with
creatural being and, on the other, he extends the task of metaphysics to the
foundation of its subject.
This thesis of Aquinas is ingenious, but is not uncontroversial. One proble-
matic aspect might be formulated in the following way: if we reduce the subject
to creatural being it seems that we break the unity of this science, since this
particular subject pertains more properly to second philosophy, and that there-
fore the only metaphysical moment is the second theological one. If, one the
other hand, the subject is a real metaphysical one (und thus the most general), it
seems that the inferential theological movement can be only an internal articula-
tion.
The resulting general impasse might be reformulated in this way: the infer-
ential nature of natural theology implies the renunciation of the transcendental
character of being and the renunciation of God’s transcendence and thus the local
impact of divine causation. The solution of Aquinas seems, on the other hand, to
break the unity of metaphysics.
15 St. Thomas AQUINAS, Super BoetiumDe Trinitate, q. 5, a. 4.
16 The term “resolution” plays a role also in Aquinas’ prologue to his commentary to Aristotle’s
metaphysics. See also Jan A. AERTSEN,Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, 234.
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In the following, I will present Meister Eckhart’s non-standard position as
a possible solution to this impasse. Before I move to the interpretation of the
Eckhartian text, I will introduce it in a general way using some ideas developed
by Saint Bonaventure.
III Non-standard natural theology
III.1 From Bonaventure to Eckhart
We have seen that Aquinas reaches his conception of common being through a so
called resolution, moving from the common material things of the world and
coming to the idea of being as a super-genus. This common being is, as said
before, the starting point of the theological inference.
It is possible, however, to consider this resolution-movement as a sort of
continuous dynamic coming directly to God and not just stopping with the esse
commune. A good example for this position can be found in Saint Bonaventure.
He makes his viewpoint clear in his Journey of the mind to God:
The activity of the intellective faculty consists in understanding the meaning of terms,
propositions, and inferences. The intellect grasps the meaning of terms when it understands
by a definition what each thing is. But a definition must be given in more general terms;
these, in turn, must be defined by others still more general, until we arrive at the highest and
more general. If these last are unknown, we cannot understand the less general by way of
definition. Consequently, unless one knows what being per se is, he cannot fully know the
definition of any particular substance. But being per se cannot be known unless it is known
together with its properties, which are one, true, and good.17
This passage points to the same resolution which Aquinas describes in his work
De veritate. In spite of this commonness there is however a difference: common
being (esse commune) is not the last stage of the resolution, since
being can be understood as incomplete or as complete, as imperfect or as perfect, as in
potencyor in act, as existing in aqualified or in anunqualifiedmanner, as a part or as awhole,
as transient or permanent, as existing through something else or per se, as mixed with non-
being or as pure being, as dependent or as absolute, as posterior or prior, as changeable or
17 St. BONAVENTURE, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, transl. by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. (Indiana-
polis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1993), 19. On this theme, see, for example, Jan A. AERTSEN, Andreas
SPEER, “Die Philosophie Bonaventuras und die Transzendentalienlehre”, Recherches de Théolo-
gie et Philosophie Médiévales 64 (1997): 32–66.
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unchangeable, as simple or composite, and since “privations and defects can in no way be
known except through something positive,” therefore our intellect does not make a full and
ultimate analysis (ut plene resolvens) of any single created being unless it is aided by a
knowledge of themost pure,most actual,most complete andabsoluteBeing [...].18
Resolution is, in other words, complete only when we reach divine being itself.19
This opens a new approach concerning the role and the function of natural
theology in the metaphysical dynamic itself.
We have seen that the idea of metaphysics as a super-science analyzing and
considering the most general objective area of reality, and the inferential char-
acter of natural theology are strictly connected and we have also seen that this
inferential movement cannot affect being as such (which remains a sort of brute
fact), but a particular portion inside the boundary of the ontological frame. On the
contrary, the idea suggested by Bonaventure, and completely developed by
Eckhart, identifies the ontological and the theological moment of metaphysics.20
This means, that we really grasp being as such, if we grasp it as divine and we
really grasp the divine, if we grasp it as immediately identical with being as such.
“To really grasp being as such” means in this context to grasp being, not as a
genus or as super-genus, but really as the all-embracing reality (as transcenden-
tal). “To really grasp God” means in this context to grasp Him not as a particular
(although extraordinary) portion of being, but as the absolute being, as being
itself. In a word, the grasping of the transcendentality of being leads immediately
to its transcendence (divine character).
Another very important aspect is the fact that this conception of natural
theology excludes every form of metaphysical inference. Obviously, in our every-
day-occurrences we are occupied with particular things and we live unaware of
the divine being, nonetheless the function of the resolution is not to perform a
metaphysical inference (for example from the being of the world to the one of
God), but to awake what we have known all along (namely the divine being).
Once again: God is metaphysical self-evidence and this implies that metaphysics
(ontology) and natural theology are completely united.
18 St. BONAVENTURE, Itinerariummentis in Deum, 19.
19 St. BONAVENTURE writes in In I Sententiarum, d.28 dub.1: “Intellectus resolvente semiplene
potest intelligi aliquid esse non intellecto primo ente. Intellectus autem resolvente perfecte non
potest intelligi aliquid primo ente non intellecto.”
20 This element of continuity between Bonaventure and Eckhart is emphasized for example by
Aertsen. See Jan A. AERTSEN, “What is first and Most Fundamental? The Beginnings of Transcen-
dental Philosophy” in: Jan A. AERTSEN and Andreas SPEER, ed.Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?
(Berlin/NewYork:Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 177–192.
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III.2 Meister Eckhart’s non-standard natural theology
III.2.1 The divine Being
After this introduction we can now move to the final analysis of the Eckhartian
position. My aim is to show that his idea of natural theology coincides with the
one I have just delineated. To showmy point I will concentrate on Eckhart’s major
Latin work, the so called Tripartite Work (Opus tripartitum).
The Tripartite Work remained unfinished, but it is still possible, especially
through the analysis of the general prologue and the prologue to the Work of
Theses (Opus propositionum, the first part of the Tripartite Work)21, to ascertain the
central idea of this project. Referring to the main thesis of this work “Being is God/
esse est Deus”, Eckhart makes some introductory remarks in the prologue to the
Work of Theses:
1) That being means in this context just being (as white signifies only the quality
of whiteness)
2) That it must be distinguished between being and ‘this’ and ‘that’ being.22
Eckhart’s idea may be summed up in the following way: when we talk about esse
in the sentence “esse est Deus”, we are not dealing with this or that being or with
being understood as this or that, but we are dealing with being qua being. In a
word, the point of view, we are dealing with, is the one of metaphysics.
In the general prologue to the Opus tripartitum Eckhart makes also some
remarks regarding the nature of this pure being. Pure being is a general term
(terminus generalis), a transcendental running through all categories. Now, this
general term is first of all prior. This priority has both an epistemological and an
ontological meaning: it is the first on an epistemological and an ontological level
(first in-itself and for us). Being as being is in this sense a bit like substantiality
(esse per se): it is something that must be there and must be understood, in order
for accidentality (esse in alio) to be and to be understood.23
21 The second and the third parts are called Work of Problems (Opus questionum) and Work of
Interpretations (Opus expositionum).
22 LW I, 166, 6–167, 8.
23 This comparison does not intend to suggest the idea that the Eckhartian position is a sort of
Spinozism. Eckhart would probably object to a Spinozistic point of view that it reduces God to
something categorial (the substance) and thus finite, and that it confounds the absolute being
(esse absolutum), which is really divine and transcends the finite determination, with the being
inhering as a form (esse formarilter inhaerens), which is intrinsically finite. Regarding this
difference see LWV, 289, 6–7.
484 Roberto Vinco
Being as being is, according to Eckhart, not only prior, it is also superior24. It
is therefore transcendental not just in the sense that it is scattered through
all categories, but also in the sense that it transcends them in a higher unity
embracing all their perfections25. Transcendentality (all-embracing unity) is
therefore transcendent (divine). The starting point of the Opus tripartitum is thus
the one delivered by a complete resolution, in which being manifests its divine
character.
This position is particularly evident if we consider the manner through which
Eckhart makes his case for the general thesis: “esse est Deus/ being is God”.
Patet haec propositio primo, quia si esse est aliud ab ipso Deo, Deus nec est nec Deus est.
Quommodo enim est aut aliquid est, a quo esse aliud, alienum et distinctum est? Aut si est
deus, alio utique est, cum esse sit aliud ab ipso. Deus igitur et esse idem, aut Deus ab alio
habet esse. Et sic non ipse Deus, ut premissum est, sed aliud ab ipso, prius ipso, est et est
sibi causa, ut sit.
This proposition is evident, first, because if being is something different from God, neither
God is nor He is God. How can something be or be something, from which being is different,
alien and distinct? Or if God is, he is surely by another, since being is different from Him.
Therefore God and being are the same, or God has being from another, and then he is not
God himself, as was said above, but something else and before him and it is the cause of his
being.26
Eckhart is not trying here to offer an argument for the existence of God, themore so
as the question “Does God exist?” concerns the second part of the Opus tripartitum
(Opus quaestionum). What he is claiming, is that we do not really understand what
God and beingmean, if we do not immediately identify them.
24 See Jan A. AERTSEN “Ontology and henology in Medieval Philosophy”, in E.P. Bos and
P.A. Meijer ed., On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy, (Leiden, New York, Cologne:
E.J. Brill, 1992), 120–140.
25 LW I, 152, 8–155, 5.
26 LW I, 156, 15–157, 4. The translation above is based (with some variations) on the one by
Armand A. Maurer. See Master ECKHART, Parisian Questions and Prologues, (Toronto: Pontifical
Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974), 85. I translated the verb “esse” as “being” and not, as Maurer
does, as “existence”, because the Eckhartian being contains not only the existential but also the
predicative being.
Many interpretations of these passages have been given. See for example: Karl ALBERT, Meister
Eckharts These vom Sein. Untersuchungen zur Metaphysik des “Opus tripartitum” (Saarbrücken:
Universitätsverlag, 1976); Fernand BRUNNER, “Commentaire: Les deux Prologues”, in L’œuvre
latine de Maître Eckhart, Vol. 1, intr., text, transl. and comm. by Fernand Brunner, Alain de Libera,
Édouard-Henri Wéber, Émilie Zum Brunn (Paris: Cerf, 1984), 1–129; Robert J. DOBIE, Logos and
Revelation (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 123–157.
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According to Eckhart, there are only two alternative positions to this immedi-
ate identification: the first one posits God beyond (or besides) being (esse est
aliud ab ipso Deo). But this position, that we could define as broadly “Neopla-
tonic”, does not seem to take into account that, if being is really transcendental
and all-embracing, it cannot be transcended in any meaningful sense. In other
words, there is neither ontological nor logical space beyond (or besides) being. In
fact, if we say that God is something beyond being, we are not stating anything
meaningful, because the meaningful “logos” (discourse) is always an expression
of being.
The second position (aut si est deus) considers God as something inside of
being, “something that is”, but in this way it regards Him as something objectifi-
able and categorical. This position, which is connected with the Avicennian
paradigma of metaphysics and with the inferential character of natural theol-
ogy, tends to consider God as a portion of reality, but in this way it does not
seem to take into account that, if God is really God (absolute), He is also the
ground of the categorical being as such and cannot therefore be in any genus.
In a word, this second alternative is (against its premises) not really talking
about God.
The only possibility left is therefore the one that identifies being and God,
ontology and theology. It is important to note that the two excluded options are
not to be considered as simply false, but rather as self-defeating positions that
cannot really express what they want to. They are, to use the Parmenideian
expression, paths “wholly without report”27. They are not real alternatives. The
identity of being and God appears thus to be the only viable option and this shows
once again its character of self-evidence.
III.2.2 The finite being
This Eckhartian position that I have delineated so far, seems, in spite of its
advantages, to have a fundamental problem.
If the grasped being is immediately divine, we are bound to say that God
occupies the “entire ontological space”. But, if this is the case, is there any place
for non-divine being at all? In a word: this conception seems to imply an acos-
mism, which is, especially from a Christian point of view, impossible to maintain.
Before we move to the Eckhartian solution, it is important to emphasize that
Eckhart himself explicitly rejects the conception of non-divine being as something
27 Fr. 2.
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existing besides God, since this would constrain God himself and reduce him to
something particular (ens hoc). It is also important to note that he explicitly
refuses a conception of creation as an act projecting something outside of God in
a sort of void space, because there is no space besides God.
What is then the Eckhartian way out? Eckhart writes in one of the central
theses of the Opus propositionum that this or that being (determinate being),
insofar it is this or that, does not “add anything of entity” (addunt entitatis) to
being itself.28 How can we translate this idea? A mathematical comparison
might be helpful. As the addition of a finite set (a set with a finite number of
elements) to an infinite one (for example, the set of the natural numbers)
cannot change the cardinality (the number of elements) of the infinite set, so a
determinate and categorical being cannot add anything to the infinite (transcen-
dental) divine being. This does not mean that a finite set does not express a real
quantity, or that the determinate finite being is an illusion. Determinate being is
in reality, but this does not imply that there is “more being” because of its
existence.
It is important to notice that Eckhart maintains that this thesis of his does not
imply the destruction of the non-divine being, but rather constitutes its real
foundation.29 Why is this the case? It is a real foundation because the determinate
and finite being doesn’t have any kind of subsistence in itself. It is dependent
through and through from the divine causation. At the same time, this being is in
reality; it is not a deception.
But what kind of reality is the one of the finite and determinate being? We can
say that the non-divine being is a relational being, it is a sign, whose essence
consists in expressing (in a finite and determinate way) the infinite and transcen-
dent divine being.30
We can thus conclude by saying that Eckhart maintains a Parmenidean con-
ception,31 according to which only pure being is what really is, but at the same time
28 LW I, 168, 2–5 “cum dico hoc ens aut unum hoc aut unum istud, verum hoc et istud, li hoc et
istud nihil prorsus addunt seu adiciunt entitatis, unitatis, veritatis aut bonitatis super ens, unum,
verum, bonum.”
29 LW I 176, 5–7 “Hoc autem dicentes non tollimus rebus esse nec esse rerum destruimus, sed
statuimus.”
30 This idea is connected with Eckhart’s particular conception of analogy. On this theme, see
among others, Alain DE LIBERA, Le problème de l’être chez Maître Eckhart: logique et métaphysique
de l’analogie (Genève/Lausanne/Neuchâtel: La Concorde, 1980), Jan A. AERTSEN, Medieval Philo-
sophy as Trasncendental Thought, 361–368.
31 On the “Parmenidian nature” of Meister Eckhart’s thinking see: Cornelio FABRO, Participation
et causalité selon S. Thomas d‘Aquin (Louvain/Paris: Editions Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1961), 551 ff.
Vladimir LOSSKY, Théologie négative et connaisance de Dieu chez Maître Eckhart (Paris: Vrin,
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(against Parmenides) he does not regard the “doxa” (the realm of the finite beings)
as an illusion, but as a reflection of (and participation in) the pure and infinite
being.32
1960), 162–164. Jan A. AERTSEN, Der ‚Systematiker‘ Eckhart”, in: Andreas Speer and Lydia Wege-
ner, ed. Meister Eckhart in Erfurt (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), 189–230. Roberto
VINCO, “Zum parmenideischen Charakter des Denkens Meister Eckharts”, Theologie und Philoso-
phie 88 (2013): 161–175.
32 In this sense it is possible to say that Eckhart combines a Parmenidian conception with a
Platonic one. Absolute reality is only the pure being (there is thus no pluralism), but, at the same
time, this pure infinite being is a sort of being in itself (being kat’auto) to which every finite
partakes.
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